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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
16913

-vsROBERT W. BOWEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

--------

.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent was charged pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 77-7-1 (1953), as amended, with an accusation seeking
to have respondent removed from public off ice.

The

accusation was filed by a Weber County Grand Jury on or
about December 27, 1979.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 21, 1980, the Honorable A. H. Ellett,
sitting as a District Court Judge in Ogden, Utah, dismissed
the accusation of the Weber County Grand Jury based on a
written objection filed by respondent.

This is an appeal
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brought by the State of Utah based on the order of
dismissal entered by the District Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the ruling of
the District Court reversed and the matter remanded
for trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent, Robert Bowen, was elected as a
County Commissioner in Weber County in November of 1978
and took office on or about January 1, 1979.

On August

7, 1979, respondent was con,victed in the Third Circuit
Court of Weber County by the Honorable Larry R. Keller of
32 counts of obtaining unemployment benefits by misrepresentation and fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-19
(1953), as amended.

Each count was a class B misdemeanor.

The offenses for which respondent was convicted occurred
prior to his election to office, although the trial
occurred after the election, and the underlying facts were
only discovered after his election to office.
On or about December 27, 1979, a Weber County
Grand Jury filed an accusation pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§

77-7-1 and § 77-7-2 (1953) , as amended, for the purpose

of removing Robert Bowen from off ice as a County Commissioner.
The accusation alleged that the conviction involved an issue
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of "moral turpitude" and thus the respondent should be
removed from office.
The respondent, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
77-7-7

S

(1953), as amended, filed a written objection to

the accusation.

The trial court granted respondent's

motion to dismiss the accusation.

The State of Utah now

appeals that ruling.
The issue on appeal is whether a public official
may be removed from off ice because he has been convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude while holding office,
although the offenses occurred prior to taking office.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PUBLIC OFFICIALS CONVICTED OF
CRIMES INVOLVING DISHONESTY AND MORAL
TURPITUDE MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE
PURSUANT TO § 77-7-1 UTAH CODE ANN.
(1953), AS AMENDED, EVEN IF THE CRIMES
WERE COMMITTED PRIOR TO TAKING OFFICE.
The removal of a public official from office in
Utah is governed by statutory authority.

The statute under

which this proceeding was initiated is Utah Code Ann. §
77-7-1 (1953), as amended, and reads as follows:
All officers of any city, county
or other political subdivision of this
state not liable to impeachment shall
be subject to removal as provided in
this chapter upon being convicted of
a felony, an indictable misdemeanor, ~
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
or malfeasance in office. {Emphasis added.)

-3-
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that the
"meaning and proper application of the statute is
determined by considering its language in light of
background and purpose."

State v. Jones, 17 U.2d

190, 407 P.2d 571, at 572 (Utah 1965); Andrus v.
Allred, 17 Utah 106, 404 P.2d 972 (Utah 1965).

This

Court held in State v. Jones, supra, that the objective
or purpose of Utah Code Ann.

§

77-7-1 and

§

77-7-2

(1953), as amended, is to provide:
. . . a method of removing from office
a public official, even though duly
elected, who betrays his trust in office,
i.e., is guilty of malfeasance or who
commits a crime of such nature as ~
demonstrate that he is unfit to hold
public officeG Id. at 572 (emphasis
added).
~
The object of removal from public office of a public
official convicted of a crime is not to punish the
incumbent, but to protect and preserve the office, and
to free the public of an unfit officer.
Several other jurisdictions have held that the
primary purpose of the removal statute is to remove public
officials from office who are unfit to hold that office.
See State ex rel. Longerholm v. Schroeder, 199 Kan. 403,
430 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1967); People ex rel. Taberski v. _
Illinois Appellate Court, First District, 278 N.E.2d 796
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(Ill. 1972); State ex rel. Zempel v. Twitchell, 59 Wash.2d
419, 367 P.2d 985 (Wash. 1962).
The law in Utah is clear that conviction of a
misdemeanor would not warrant removal from office, unless
the conviction involved matters of "moral turpitude" or
"malfeasance" in office.

For a misdemeanor to work a

forfeiture of office the offense must involve lack of
honesty or integrity, that is, unfitness to hold office.
Respondent's conviction definitely involved
"moral turpitude" and therefore

the removal statute was

applicable.
The trial court ruled in this case that
respondent was convicted of 32 misdemeanors involving
moral turpitude during his term of office (T.3 and
Memorandum Decision).

The trial court said the offense

of obtaining unemployment benefits by misrepresentation
was a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
In State v. Jones,

supra~

the Utah Supreme

Court was confronted with the same question of whether
a misdemeanor conviction involved the issue of moral
turpitude.

In that case, David P. Jones, a Salt Lake

County Auditor, was convicted on April 7, 1965, of
a misdemeanor offense for failing to file an income
tax return on April 15, 1959.

-5-

Shortly after the defendant's
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conviction, the Salt Lake County Attorney commenced an
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1953), as
amended, to remove the defendant from office.

The action

was initiated based upon the defendant's misdemeanor
conviction.

The Supreme Court of Utah was confronted

with two issues:

(1) did the misdemeanor offense for

failing to file an income tax return involve an issue of
moral turpitude; and (2) can a public official elected to
off ice be removed because of his conviction for a
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, even though the
offense occurred before his election to office.
In addressing the question of whether the
conviction involved an issue of moral turpitude, the Utah
Supreme Court said in order to forfeit office, the
offense must be within a class of crimes which guilt would
demonstrate a lack of honesty, integrity or moral character
so as to render one unfit for public office.

The Supreme

Court said the offense of failing to file an income tax
return was not necessarily one involving moral turpitude.
The record was not clear why Mr. Jones failed to file his
tax return.

The court said there were several possible

reasons why the return was not filed, including lack of
funds, a personal vendetta with the federal government, or
tax evasion.

The Supreme Court concluded that since the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

the offense of failing to file a tax return did not
necessarily involve a lack of honesty or moral turpitude,
the defendant could not be removed from office.
In this case, the trial court ruled that
obtaining unemployment benefits by misrepresentation
demonstrated a lack of honesty, integrity or moral
character and therefore was sufficient to constitute a
crime involving moral turpitude.

Appellant agrees with

the trial court's ruling that respondent's conviction
for obtaining unemployment benefits by misrepresentation
involves moral turpitude.
The purpose of the Utah Removal Statute is to
remove public officials from off ice when convicted of a
crime involving dishonesty or lack of integrity.

Certainly,

respondent's 32 misdemeanor convictions for illegally
obtaining public funds, unemployment benefits, qualifies
respondent for removal from office, especially from an
office which directs and controls, so intimately, public
funds.

Although the misdemeanor conviction occurred

while the defendant was in office, and although the crimes
were not discovered until after the defendant took office,
the trial court concluded that removal was justified only
if the offense occurred while the respondent was serving
office. (T. 6) .

-7-
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Appellant submits that the trial court erred
in its interpretation of the Removal Statute.which is
designed to remove unfit persons from office.

The

critical factor should be when the crime was discovered
and when the conviction was obtained; not when the offense
occurred.

To allow a public official to remain in office

after being convicted of an offense involving moral
turpitude is to defeat the purpose of the Removal Statute.
The issue is one of first impression for the Utah
Supreme Court.

In State v. Jones, supra, the Court was

confronted with this same issue but ruled on other grounds.
Even the trial court noted in its Memorandum Decision
that State v. Jones, supra, was decided on other grounds
(p. 2, Memorandum Decision).
Several jurisdictions have held that misconduct
occurring prior to election or in a prior term of office
may constitute grounds for removing the guilty public
officer from his present term of office.
In Application of Baker, 386 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1976),
the Supreme Court of New York said the statute providing
for removal for misconduct "in office" allowed removal
of an officer for misconduct in a prior term where all of
the charges were not made public until after election and
where the office holder had denied any wrongdoing.

See
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also In the Matter of Corwin, 218 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1961).
In Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458,
131 N.E. 573, 132 N.E. 322, 17 A.L.R. 274, the court
was confronted with a situation where a number of offenses,
including acts as a private citizen, had been charged
against a district attorney in removal proceeding.
The court said that the illegal acts or misconduct which
occurred outside the district attorney's official duties
could be considered in determining his fitness to hold
public office.

Bolton v. Tully, 158 A. 805 (Conn. 1932);

Hawkins v. Grand Rapids, 158 N.W. 953 (Mich. 1916);
State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden, 88 N.W. 412 (Minn. 1901).
The reason for removing guilty public officials
from office for crimes committed prior to election is
based on the theory that the crime or misconduct may have
been hidden from the electing body until after the start
of the new term of office, thus the voters did not have
opportunity to ensure fit public officials.

In the present

case the discovery of the offense came after the election
and the only recourse for insuring a fit and honest official
would be through§ 77-7-1 Utah Code Ann., et seq.
Legally, respondent was not unfit to hold office
until his conviction was entered for obtaining unemployment
benefits by misrepresentation.

-9-

Charging the defendant with
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a misdemeanor offense would have been insufficient to
warrant a removal proceeding.

In State v. Stavar, 578 P.2d

847 (1978), the Supreme Court said a conviction of one of
the offenses enumerated in Section 77-7-1, Utah Code Ann.
(1953), as amended, is a prerequisite to bringing an action
for removal from office.

The Stavar decision is consistent

with the principle of criminal law that the defendant is
presumed innocent until proven guilty.

A public official

cannot be removed from office until a conviction is obtained.
Since the only logical time centers on the
time of conviction rather than the time of offense, the
trial court decision should be reversed and the matter
remanded for trial.

The trial court's decision that the

offense must occur while the respondent is in off ice is
inconsistent with Stavar and the presumption of innocence.
The conviction of respondent demonstrating his dishonesty
and unfitness to hold office should be sufficient to warrant
his removal from public office.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and supporting
case law, appellant urges this Court to reverse the trial
court ruling and remand the case to district court for
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trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
ERNIE JONES
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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